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Recently Bob Russell published an impossibility result with Chuck Blackorby.  The
gentlemen argue that it is impossible to aggregate efficiency indices.  Since some of
us make a descent living decomposing the efficiency of an economy into sectoral
contributions the question raises if we are crooks.  This paper attempts to give an
answer to this question.
Blackorby and Russell (1999) state:
“Perhaps more disturbing is the fact that the principal indexes proposed by Debreu
(1951) and Farrell (1957), by Färe and Lovell (1978) and by Zieschang (1983) cannot
satisfy these [aggregation] conditions for any technologies, even linear ones.”
The subsequent relaxation of these aggregation conditions by Blackorby and Russell
(1999) offers little comfort:
“In particular, the [relaxed] aggregation condition provides a rationalization of the
Debreu/Farrell efficiency measure, albeit for a very restrictive (linear) class of
technologies.”
A first step in the process of recovery from bad news is to take stock of the issues.  I
shall clarify a number of things.   First,  what  are efficiency  measures?    The
Debreu/Farrell name, however much in the air as a reference for a general measure of
efficiency, is misleading.  The Debreu and Farrell measures better be delineated vis-à-
vis each other.  Second, can we disaggregate these measures?  
The upshot of this paper is a redirection of the measurement of efficiency: top-down
instead of bottom-up.  I hope the reader will feel better again.
22. Efficiency measures: Debreu and Farrell or Diewert?
Consider an economy comprising  l  commodities,  m  consumers, with preference
relationships  ≿i  and observed consumption vectors  x
0
i   ℝ
l  (i  = 1, ..., m), and n
production units with sets of possible (net) input vectors  Yj    ℝ
l  containing the
observed input vector y
0
j (j = 1, ..., n).  A combination of consumption vectors and an
input vector is  feasible  if the total sum does not exceed the vector of  utilizable
physical resources, z
0, which is the datum of the economy.  This constraint is binding
for the observed inputs:
∑x
0
i  + ∑y
0




The better set of net consumption vectors is defined by 
ℬ =  {∑xi xi ≿i  x
0
i, i=1,...,m} + ∑Yj  
(2)
Debreu (1951) defines the coefficient of resource allocation by 
ρ = Max p(z)ּz/p(z)ּz
0 subject to z  ℬ
min
(3)
Coefficient  ρ  measures the distance from the set of minimally required physical
resources,  z    ℬ
min, to the utilizable physical resources,  z
0, in the metric of the
supporting prices (which indicate welfare indeed).  Debreu (1951, p. 284) proves that






In modern terminology, this result means that  ρ  is the  input-distance function,
determined by the program
Min ρ subject to ∑xi + ∑yj ≦ ρz
0, xi ≿i x
0
i, yj  Yj
(5)
Farrell (1957) decomposes efficiency in technical efficiency and allocative efficiency.
He notes the similarity between his technical efficiency measure and the Debreu
coefficient  of resource utilization.   Indeed, both concepts  are  defined through
proportionate input contractions.   Nonetheless, the analogy is sheer formality and
confusing at a conceptual level.  It suggests that Farrell takes the Debreu coefficient,
augments it, and thus constructs a more encompassing overall measure.  It is the other
way round; the sway of the Debreu coefficient is far greater than that of Farrell’s
measure.    Particularly  Farrell’s  allocative  efficiency  measure  is  a  partial (dis)
equilibrium concept, conditioned on prices.  It takes into account the cost reduction
attainable by changing the mix of the inputs,  given  the prices of the latter.   The
Debreu coefficient, however, is a general (dis)equilibrium concept.  It measures the
technical and allocative inefficiency in the economy given only its fundamentals:
resources, technology, and preferences.  Prices are derived and enter the definition of
the Debreu coefficient, see (3).  Debreu proves that the coefficient can be freed from
these prices, by formula (4) or nonlinear program (5).   Prices remain implicit,
however.  They support the better set in the point of minimally required physical
resources and will be revealed in this paper.   The Debreu coefficient measures
technical and allocative inefficiency, both in production and consumption, solving the
formidable difficulty involved in assessing prices, referred to by Charnes, Cooper, and
Rhodes (1978, p. 438).   Farrell refrains from this, restricting himself to technical
efficiency and price-conditioned allocative efficiency.  
The formal analogy between the Debreu coefficient and the Farrell measure of
technical efficiency prompted Färe and Lovell (1978) to coin the phrase “Debreu-
Farrell measures of efficiency.”  This is confusing.  Debreu’s coefficient of resource
4allocation encompasses both Farrell’s technical efficiency and his allocative efficiency
measures, plus frees the latter from prices.  On top of this, Debreu’s coefficient also
captures consumers’ inefficiencies.  The confusion persists.  In a very recent review of
Farrell’s contribution Førsund and Sarafoglou (2002, footnote 4) state 
“(Debreu) worked only from the resource cost side, defining his coefficient as the
ratio between minimised resource costs of obtaining a given consumption bundle and
actual costs, for given prices and a proportional contraction of resources.”  
Debreu (1951) calculates the resource costs not of a given consumption bundle, but of
an (intelligently chosen) Pareto equivalent allocation.  (And the prices are not given,
but support the allocation.)  
Yet, let me bridge the difference.  Following Diewert (1983), I limit inefficiency to
production by assuming Leontief preferences.   Under this assumption Debreu’s
program (5) can be shown to reduce to
Min ρ subject to ∑x
0
i + ∑yj ≦ ρz
0, yj  Yj
(6)
The detail is in ten Raa (2003) who calls the consequent  ρ  the  Debreu-Diewert
efficiency measure.
3. An example
Let us consider an economy producing a single consumption good.  Denote the inputs
by vector l.  The available stock of inputs is l
0.  The production possibilities are given






 Efficiency program (6) reads
Min ρ subject to ∑x
0
i ≦ F1(l1) + F2(l2) and l1 + l2 ≦ ρl
0
(7)
5The solution denotes the Debreu-Diewert efficiency of the economy. Denote the
efficient inputs by l1
 and l2 and contrast them with the observed inputs.  The question
is: How efficient are the units?   It may very well be that both units produce the
maximum output given their inputs, but that the distribution of inputs is inefficient.
For example, if there is only one input and the units have the same, strictly concave
production function, say F, then the efficient distribution of inputs is fifty/fifty.  This
example, however simple, conveys the message of Blackorby and Russell (1999).
The efficiency of the units in the sense of maximizing output given the inputs does
not imply that the constellation of the two units is efficient.  
Is there no way to cope with this example?  My idea is to look at profits, not at market
prices, but at shadow prices.   Choosing the consumption good as numerair, the
shadow prices of the inputs are their marginal products or the vector of partial
derivatives  F’(ρl
0/2),   evaluated   at   the   optimum.     These   input   prices   will   be
intermediate, higher than the marginal product of a big unit, smaller than the marginal
product of a small unit (assuming concavity).  I shall consider the small unit relatively
efficient.  The big unit will pick up more inefficiency.  
 
4. Back to the model
Let the production possibility set be given by  Yj  = {yj|Fj(yj)  ≥  0} where the
differentiable functions Fj are concave.  (In the previous example these functions map
(l, -x) into Fj(l) – x: the value of the production function of the previous section at
input vector  l  minus output.   Since the functions are concave the differentiability
assumption can be dropped and the subsequent analysis would be in terms of
subgradients.)  Efficiency program (6) reads
Min ρ subject to ∑x
0
i + ∑yj ≦ ρz
0, Fj(yj) ≥ 0
(8)
  
6Unlike   the   Blackorby   and   Russell   (1999)   condition,  Fj  need   not   be   linear.
Consequently, (8) is a nonlinear program.   According to Wolfe (1961) the dual
program is
Maxρ, y, p, τ  ρ – p(ρz
0 – ∑yj – ∑x
0
i) – τF(y) 
subject to pz
0 = 1, p = τF’(y), and p, τ ≥ 0
(9)
and by his Theorem 2 (9) has the same solution value as (8).  Here F is the vector with
components Fj and F’ is the matrix with the j-th row displaying the partial derivatives
of Fj.  Notice that the first two terms in (9) cancel by the first dual constraint.  
The analysis becomes highly transparent if we assume constant returns to scale, or, in
Blackorby and Russell (1999) jargon, linear homogeneity.  In this case Blackorby and
Russell (1999) argue that the inputs must be perfect substitutes and the outputs must
be perfect substitutes.  This prohibitive restriction rules out CES functions and even
the case of fixed input coefficients, and reduces (9) to a linear program.   Under
general linear homogeneity, however, (9) remains a nonlinear program, but the third
and fifth terms in (9) cancel by the second dual constraint and Euler’s theorem.
Hence only the fourth term remains and we obtain 
Maxy, p, τ p∑x
0
i subject to pz
0 = 1, p = τF’(y), and p, τ ≥ 0
(10)





Now value the observed inputs and resources, see equation (1), by the shadow prices.
Substituting (10) and (11), and rearranging terms, I obtain 




On the left hand side is inefficiency and on the right hand side are losses at shadow
prices.  (Remember y
0
j are net input vectors.)  The shadow prices are given by the
second dual constraint of (9) or (10), namely p = τF’(y).  These are the marginal
products of the efficient units.  If a unit is inefficient, that is within its own frontier—
Fj(yj) > 0—then τj = 0 by the phenomenon of complementary slackness (which is
equivalent to Wolfe’s Theorem 2) and it plays no role in price formation.  
5. Another example
Consider an economy with one input (L) and one output (Y).   The production









2) = (½β, ½).  Notice that both units are
efficient in the sense of being on their frontiers.  Blackorby and Russell (1999) argue
that output (input) aggregation of efficiency indices is possible only if the efficiency
indices are ratios of linear functions of input and output quantities and the aggregate
index is a weighted average.  Moreover, these functions must be common to all units.
This implies the first of the following statements.
  
I. The economy is efficient if and only if β = 1.
II. If β < 1, the efficient allocation is 
(Y1, L1) = (½ + ½β, ½ + ½β), (Y2, L2) = (0, 0).  
Hence efficiency ρ = ½ + ½β and inefficiency 1 – ρ = ½ – ½β.
III. If β > 1, the efficient allocation is 
(Y1, L1) = (0, 0), (Y2, L2) = (½ + ½β, ½β
-1 + ½).  
Hence efficiency ρ = ½β
-1 + ½ and inefficiency 1 – ρ = ½ – ½β
-1.
8To decompose inefficiency, let us first determine the shadow prices.  The first dual
constraint, see (9) or (10) normalizes the shadow price of the input to 1.  The shadow
price of the output is 1 in cases I and II and β
-1 in case III.
I. Both units make zero losses at shadow prices, hence pick up zero
inefficiency.   This is in perfect agreement with Blackorby and Russell
(1999).
II. At shadow prices the losses of the units are ½ – ½ and ½ – ½β,
respectively.   The inefficiency is imputed entirely to the second unit.
Indeed, it should be out of business.
III. At shadow prices the losses of the units are ½  – ½β
-1  and ½ – ½ββ
-1,
respectively.  The inefficiency is imputed entirely to the first unit.  Indeed,
it should be out of business.
The point of the example is that inefficiency has been decomposed in cases where
efficiency cannot be aggregated according to Blackorby and Russell (1999).   The
result holds for nonlinear technologies, like CES functions, including the limiting
case of a Leontief function.  
6. Conclusion
To determine the efficiency of a constellation of production units we need the
following data.  
a. The inputs and outputs of each unit
b. The production possibilities of each unit
Notice that this is no more than what is required by Blackorby and Russell (1999).  
I suggest we proceed as follows.  The first step is to compute the efficiency of the
system of the units.  This is done by contracting the total input of the system subject to
the condition that total output is preserved, allowing for reallocations of the inputs and
outputs between the units.  The percentage by which contraction is feasible is the
inefficiency in the economy.  The second step is to compute the shadow prices of the
contraction program.   They are the marginal products of the efficient units.   The
9output shadow prices will be low, as they reflect best practice costs.  The third step is
to value the units (in terms of profits) at shadow prices.  Under constant returns to
scale the best practice units break even; their values are zero.  The other units incur
losses though.  This paper has shown that the losses sum to the aggregate inefficiency.
This completes the decomposition of inefficiency.
The inefficiency of a unit can have two sources.  First, the unit may operate within its
possibility frontier.  Second, the unit may produce the wrong output vector, not the
one implied by the optimal allocation of inputs between units.  This allocative source
of firm inefficiency should not be neglected.   If one neglects it, one obtains
impossibility results on the aggregation of efficiency indices.  If one takes it into
account, inefficiency can be disaggregated.  With Richard Nixon, let me conclude “I
am not a crook.”
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